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AbstrAct
The technological benefits of space hardware 
are universally recognized. One is hard pres-
sed to find an area of the world where satellite 
dishes for television reception, satellite use for 
data transmission, or the Global Positioning 
System (gps) for multiple purposes are not 
utilized. But utilization of commercial or of 
other countries’ space assets does not equate 
to being a space-faring nation. Space-faring 
nations have, to varying degrees, their own 
capabilities. The importance of status as a 
space-faring nation comes from two sources: 
not having to rely on others for access to the 
benefits of space assets, and prestige that can 
translate into geopolitical influence. Beyond 
users and space-faring nations, there are those 
countries actively asserting space leadership in 
some form, whether regional or global. What 
pushes countries to go beyond being a space-
faring nation and assert leadership potential, 
including potentially engaging in an implicit 
or explicit space race, is techno-nationalism, 
which for the purposes of this paper refers to 
nationalism that becomes the impetus for te-
chnology development as an indicator of geos-
trategic power. It is often triggered by a threat 
or perception of a threat, including a threat 
to perceived leadership. Techno-nationalism 
carries with it an inherent quest for leadership, 
by some definition.
Key words: Space, leadership, nasa, Chi-
na, exceptionalism.
el empuje geoestratégico 
del tecno-nacionalismo  
en el espacio
resumen
Los beneficios de las aplicaciones espaciales son 
reconocidos universalmente. Es difícil encon-
trar algún área del mundo en que las antenas 
parabólicas satelitales para recepción televisi-
va, uso satelital para transmisión de datos, o 
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el Sistema de Posicionamiento Global (gps) 
para aplicaciones múltiples, no sean usados. 
Pero la utilización comercial o con equipos 
provenientes de terceros países no equivale a ser 
una potencia espacial. Las potencias espaciales 
tienen, en diferentes grados, sus propias capaci-
dades. La importancia del estatus y el prestigio 
de serlo proviene de dos fuentes: no tener que 
depender de otros para acceder a los beneficios 
de bienes espaciales, y que el prestigio pueda 
traducirse en influencia geopolítica. A parte de 
los usuarios y las potencias espaciales, existen 
otros países que están afirmando activamente 
su liderazgo espacial en alguna forma, ya sea 
regional o global. Lo que impulsa a los Es-
tados, más allá de ser potencias regionales y 
afirmar su potencial liderazgo, incluyendo la 
participación en una carrera espacial explícita o 
implícita, es el tecnonacionalismo, que para los 
propósitos de este ensayo se refiere al naciona-
lismo que se transforma en ímpetu para el de-
sarrollo tecnológico como indicador de poder 
geoestratégico. Es comúnmente inducido por 
una amenaza o percepción de la misma, que 
incluye una amenaza al liderazgo percibido. 
Según se ha definido, el tecnonacionalismo 
conlleva una inherente búsqueda de liderazgo.
Palabras clave: espacio, liderazgo, nasa, 
China, excepcionalismo.
Space is heralded as the Final Frontier. It is 
embodied by mythical references, symbolizes 
heroism, the future and technological achie-
vement, and carries with it connotations of 
leadership for those individuals, groups and 
countries bold enough, smart enough and 
persistent enough to overcome its challenges 
and hardships. The United States and the then 
Soviet Union engaged in a superpower race 
to the Moon in the 1960’s, until the Soviets 
dropped out because it was clear the Uni-
ted States had prevailed. And prevail it had, 
triumphantly landing on and returning a crew 
from the Moon within a decade of President 
John Kennedy’s 1962 announcement of the 
United States’ intent to do so. Recognizing 
the technological and symbolic importance 
of space, Europe and Japan began to build 
space programs in the 1960’s as well, though 
on a smaller, less-ambitious scale. Space was 
originally the domain of the economically and 
technically developed countries.
More recently, the number and types of 
“space players” has expanded. Individuals, 
billionaires such as Elon Musk, have created 
companies like SpaceX to provide Low Earth 
orbit launch services. But it is still national 
efforts that are able to make the kind of inves-
tments required for large-scale space develop-
ment and exploration efforts. Countries from 
Argentina to zambia have (or, in the case of 
zambia, have had) space programs that stretch 
beyond utilization of others’ space assets. Space 
development and exploration is risky and un-
questionably expensive, often prohibitively so, 
which is why aspirations often exceed activity 
in developing countries.
The technological benefits of space hard-
ware are universally recognized. One is hard 
pressed to find an area of the world where 
satellite dishes for television reception, sate-
llite use for data transmission, or the Global 
Positioning System (gps) for multiple purposes 
are not utilized. But utilization of commercial 
or other countries’ space assets does not equate 
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to being a space-faring nation. Space-faring 
nations have, to varying degrees, their own 
capabilities. The importance of status as a 
space-faring nation comes from two sources: 
not having to rely on others for access to the 
benefits of space assets, and prestige that can 
translate into geopolitical influence. Beyond 
users and space-faring nations, there are those 
countries actively asserting space leadership in 
some form, whether regional or global. What 
pushes countries to go beyond being a space-
faring nation and assert leadership potential, 
including potentially engaging in an implicit 
or explicit space race, is techno-nationalism, 
which for the purposes of this paper refers 
to nationalism that becomes the impetus for 
technology development (Sulfikar, 2007) as 
an indicator of geostrategic power. It is often 
triggered by a threat or perception of a threat, 
including a threat to perceived leadership. 
Techno-nationalism carries with it an inherent 
quest for leadership, by some definition.
sPAce cHOIces
Space assets are essential for countries seeking 
to have or maintain a modern military, and 
as a development tool in a globalized world. 
Much of that technology is available commer-
cially today, far more so than in the past when 
these assets were largely controlled by a small 
number of government security organizations. 
So countries have the option of being a con-
sumer of space information and capabilities, 
or an owner.
Every country has been faced with the 
issue of what degree of dependence on other 
countries for space capabilities is judicious –in 
other words, how much risk is acceptable– 
with the alternative being making the large 
investments required for autonomy. Europe 
decided to invest in launch technology after 
issues with the United States about launching 
the European Symphonie satellites in the 
1970’s, the U.S. fearing those satellites would 
lead to a competitive European communica-
tions satellite industry (Johnson-Freese, 2007, 
p. 33). Conversely, however, Canada decided 
to focus on the development of satellites, and 
leave launches to other countries to avoid 
both the research and capital investments that 
would have been required. Similarly, Europe 
decided to invest in its own satellite navigation 
system, Galileo, because it did not want to 
become overly reliant on the U.S. military-
owned Global Positioning System which, with 
the internet, is considered one of two global 
utilities. And when the United States and Rus-
sia became locked in dispute over the Crimea, 
the imprudence of the U.S. allowing itself to 
become reliant on the Russians for transporta-
tion to the International Space Station became 
an issue (Munsil, 2014). The economics of spa-
ce, however, can override desires for autonomy.
Clearly, however, there are times when 
economic prudence can be overridden by 
geostrategic, techno-nationalist concerns. 
The United States and the Soviet Union raced 
to the Moon not for any tangible return-on-
investment or to obtain any specific techno-
logy (though the technology leaps made and 
benefits derived were substantial), but because 
of the leadership implications associated with 
technological achievements in general. Te-
chnological prowess was seen as a Cold War 
indicator of power, and both the United States 
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and the Soviet Union sought to convince the 
non-aligned countries that preferentiality to 
them was their best political option.
Space technology is also largely dual-use 
technology, meaning it is of value to both civi-
lian and military communities, with associated 
positive and negative spillover. On the positive 
side, investment in one piece of hardware, a 
remote sensing satellite for example, can yield 
benefits for civilian urban planners and mi-
litary surveillance. Japan has been especially 
creative in exploiting dual use technology to 
avoid legal issues presented by the Japanese 
constitutional restrictions reserving space 
for “peaceful purposes” only, with “peaceful” 
defined as “non-military” (Johnson-Freese & 
Gatling, 2004).
Difficulties with dual-use technology 
arise though, because the technology provides 
capabilities but does not define intended use. 
The technological differences between a rocket 
and a missile are matters of modification: the 
workhorses of the early U.S. rocket fleet, Atlas, 
Delta and Titan, were all born as warhead-
carrying missiles. Small maneuverable satellites 
recently proposed as useful to monitor and 
potentially help abate space debris could te-
chnically also be used to ram a satellite and so 
be considered a space weapon. Consequently, 
space technology is highly ambiguous and 
can trigger security dilemmas. Sometimes, the 
geopolitical perception of a threat is enough 
to trigger responsive, and expensive, space 
activity in other countries, activity that might 
otherwise have been deemed unwarranted.
LeADersHIP AnD sPAce rAce trIGGers
In a 2011 article, Louis Friedman, the former 
Executive Director of The Planetary Society, 
lamented American neglect of positive space 
leadership implications as related to foreign 
policy. “Sometimes, the connection between 
space exploration and foreign relations has 
even been belittled in the space community… 
space exploration and development are often 
overlooked in foreign relations and geopolitical 
strategies” (Friedman, 2011). That neglect was 
once not the case. The 1958 Space Act creating 
nasa included directives for international coo-
peration, as a way of building and cementing 
relations with other countries. Beginning with 
early scientific missions and launch opportuni-
ties, nasa reached out to other countries, and 
the Space Transportation System (the Shuttle 
program) included international participants. 
More recently, the International Space Station, 
Cassini-Huygens, the James Webb Space Te-
lescope, the Europa Jupiter System Mission, 
Mars 2016/2018 and Earth observing satellites 
all involve more than one country.
When, however, does nationalism over-
power internationalism and pragmatism, and 
evolve into techno-nationalism that can even 
lead to engaging in a space race? The answer 
seems to be when a leadership challenge is in-
volved. Clearly, there was a nationalistic drive 
behind the Apollo program, and substantial 
global leadership rewards were reaped from 
its success. More recently, examining the case 
of India and China is illustrative, and provides 
parameters for considering implications for 
other countries.
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cHInA-InDIA
Chinese interest in space after independence 
in 1949 focused largely on building systems 
to facilitate economic development and link 
the information flow across China’s vast geo-
graphic areas. Just as the Europeans had in the 
1960’s, the Chinese understood the relations-
hip between space and technology, technology 
and industrialization, and industrialization 
and economic growth (Johnson-Freese, 2007, 
p. 170). Later, China watched and apprecia-
ted the varied benefits that the U.S. and other 
advanced countries garnered from space. The 
Apollo program yielded benefits ranging from 
student interest in science and engineering to 
prestige that translates into geostrategic in-
fluence. China saw and understood the mili-
tary value of space capabilities the U.S. clearly 
demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf War, with 
the broad employment of the Global Positio-
ning System (gps) and space systems genera-
lly for command, control, communication, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(c3isr). China’s 2011 White Paper on space 
states “Space activities play an increasingly 
important role in China’s economic and so-
cial development” (Information Office of the 
State Council, 2011). Further, dual-use space 
technology has both civilian and military 
applications, important for military moder-
nization, with an increasing emphasis on the 
latter. Consequently, China currently seeks a 
broad spectrum of space capabilities.
China’s modern day space program requi-
red serious rebuilding at the end of the 1960’s 
Cultural Revolution. Much of its scientific 
and engineering talent had been scattered, or 
worse, during the reign of the Red Guard, so 
those left with the task faced a steep learning 
curve. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders recogni-
zed the value of space assets and persevered, 
largely on their own until the late 1980’s. By 
1990 China was launching not only Chinese-
built satellites, but those such as AsiaSat, built 
by the Hughes company in the United States. 
Indeed during the decade of the 90’s, China 
was establishing itself as a commercial launch 
provider, establishing global relationships that 
proved financially and politically lucrative.
China’s international launch profile chan-
ged though, with the release of the highly po-
liticized 1998 Cox Commission report in the 
United States. That report included sensatio-
nalist allegations of China illegally obtaining 
U.S. nuclear secrets from Los Alamos National 
Laboratory scientist, Dr. Wen Ho Lee, and 
information that would greatly improve their 
missile capabilities from American aerospace 
companies (Select Comittee, United States 
House of Representatives, 1999). Scientists 
and analysts quickly critiqued the report fin-
dings, most notably in a Stanford University 
analysis stating it contained numerous errors 
and misrepresentations (May, Panofsky, Johns-
ton, Di Capua & Franklin, 2000). Neverthe-
less, the report triggered new and draconian 
U.S. export control laws on dual use space 
technology, laws that would prove damaging 
to the U.S. satellite industry (Johnson-Freese, 
2001; 2000), spur satellite industry develop-
ment outside the United States, curtail Chine-
se commercial launch business, and virtually 
quashed U.S.-China space relations. The Cox 
Committee Report also provided the impe-
tus for a U.S.-China military space race, one 
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characterized by U.S. rhetoric about “space 
dominance”, though with little overall effect 
on Chinese space technology development.
China had announced plans in 1992 for 
a 3 step human spaceflight program, called 
Project 921, or Shenzhou (actually the name 
of the capsule which carries its astronauts, or 
taikonauts). The first step was achieved in 2003 
with demonstration of basic human spaceflight 
capabilities. In 2008 China moved on to step 
two, demonstration of more advanced space-
flight capabilities, such as docking and maneu-
vering in space. They are well into this phase in 
2014, including docking with a small orbiting 
technology testbed, called Tiangong, which 
is capable of serving as a temporary manned 
laboratory as well. Project 921 will culmina-
te with China having a large, permanently 
manned space station in orbit, likely around 
2023 (Beard, 2013). yang Liwei, China’s first 
astronaut and now deputy director of China’s 
Manned Space Agency, has already stated that 
China will welcome foreign astronauts on its 
space station and provide training toward 
enabling others to develop their own space 
projects (Space Daily, 2013).
Militarily, in areas such as development 
of anti-satellite (asat) capabilities for example, 
China is advancing quickly. asat technology, 
however, is very similar if not symbiotic to that 
of missile defense technology. China overtly 
held one asat test in 2007. That test on one 
of its own moribund satellites, which irrespon-
sibly created massive amounts of dangerous 
space debris, seriously hurt China’s ability to 
portray itself as a responsible space-faring na-
tion. But China has long viewed U.S. missile 
defense capabilities as having significant offen-
sive potential, confirmed to them in 2008’s 
Operation Burnt Frost where the U.S. used 
missile defense technology to destroy a failing 
U.S. satellite claimed dangerous to the public. 
Since 2007, China has tested its asat-capable 
technology under the guise of missile defense 
tests. Additionally, tracking stations necessary 
for human spaceflight missions, can also be 
useful for military purposes such as tracking 
missiles. Undoubtedly, China has multiple jus-
tifications for space technology development.
Though international journalists, and 
policy officials who should know better, fre-
quently write and talk about a Chinese man-
ned lunar mission, as yet there is no such offi-
cial program. Individuals in China sometimes 
speak about manned lunar landings as a given 
(sometimes just to chafe and spin-up U.S. offi-
cials), but that is not the case. Ouyang ziyuan, 
a geologist and chief lunar scientist for the ro-
botic Chang’e lunar exploration program, for 
example, has long and very publicly endorsed 
a manned lunar mission and his comments are 
often mistaken by Western media as official go-
vernment policy. He also hints at exploration 
of the moon for Helium-3, a potential fuel 
for a fusion reactor. Mining Helium-3 as an 
economic rationale for lunar exploration once 
made its way through Washington circles as 
well –though no fusion reactor exists where it 
could be used. While the potential for lunar 
mining is very real, it is also a very long way 
off. Use of this rationalization now may signal 
efforts by scientists to address political ques-
tions about “return on investment”.
It has only been in recent years that a 
manned lunar mission has been seriously dis-
cussed in China, first within the space com-
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munity and then among decision-makers. 
Chinese officials prudently first focused on 
testing requisite capabilities through the man-
ned Shenzhou and robotic Chang’e programs. 
While there is certainly enthusiasm among 
some groups, there is also skepticism– just as 
there was in the United States regarding the 
Apollo program –among some scientists and 
politicians that such a program would require 
too much focused funding in one scientific 
area, at the expense of others. Still, Chinese 
leaders are aware that China has reaped sig-
nificant regional –and global– geostrategic 
benefits, including the demonstration of te-
chnical prowess and attracting students to 
science and engineering programs, as well as 
dual-use military capabilities, from its space 
efforts. Though it is likely that a merging of 
the Chang’e and Shenzhou programs will 
eventually be officially approved and expanded 
as a manned lunar program, it has not occu-
rred yet. In the meantime though, China has 
already reaped considerable political benefits 
from its space successes, including extensive 
international media coverage of Chinese hu-
man spaceflights.
The 1957 launch of Sputnik was a huge 
psychological boost for both the Soviet people 
and the Soviet government during the Cold 
War, and conversely a huge blow to both the 
people and the government of the United 
States (Johnson-Freese, 2004). Pride, and a 
consequent “rallying-around” in the Soviet 
Union after Sputnik (as experienced as well 
in the United States after the Apollo moon 
landing), also translated into credibility and 
hence governmental legitimacy. Credibility 
and legitimacy are important considerations 
in Beijing as well. Shenzhou V carried yang 
Liwei, the first Chinese astronaut, or taiko-
naut, into orbit in 2004. One Chinese official 
stated of that launch, “This is not America 
where money comes from the taxpayers. This 
is money of the Communist Party –they would 
do with it what they decide. It is great they are 
investing in something that makes us proud” 
(Bezlova, 2003). Beijing’s interest in manned 
spaceflight for reasons of domestic pride and 
international prestige parallels its interest in 
bringing the Olympics to Beijing in 2008. 
Indeed, yang carried an Olympic flag with 
him into orbit, unfurling it ceremoniously 
upon his return.
Most post-launch Shenzhou V celebra-
tions appeared largely choreographed, as op-
posed to the many celebrations that sponta-
neously erupted when Beijing was named the 
2008 Olympic host city. The space mission was 
both an event meant to be filmed and shown to 
the world, and one directed by and supported 
from the top levels of government. Having 
planned celebrations at the Millennium Mo-
nument rather than in Tiananmen Square 
also deflected comparisons with or reference 
to other times in Tiananmen that were neither 
celebratory nor reflective of national pride and 
unity. Symbolism is important.
Launching a person into orbit is a te-
chnical feat not achieved by any of the other 
regional space contenders, including Japan 
and India, and it carries with it significant 
leadership cachet. Officials from around the 
world, and particularly the region, sent con-
gratulatory telegrams to President Hu Jintao. 
Initial Japanese responses to the launch varied. 
Some space officials discounted the technical 
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significance of the event while nonetheless 
congratulating China. One Japanese official 
spoke directly in geostrategic terms.
Japan is likely to be the one to take the severest 
blow from the Chinese success. A country capable 
of launching any time will have a large influence in 
terms of diplomacy at the United Nations and mili-
tary affairs. Moves to buy products from a country 
succeeding in manned space flight may occur (Japan 
Economic Newswire, 2003).
Space Activities Commission member Hiroki 
Matsuo candidly stated that “discussions on 
manned space flight have long been simme-
ring in Japan”, and he further implied that the 
launch would likely trigger a reconsideration 
of Japanese goals for space development. One 
woman on the street was quoted in Japanese 
media coverage as saying, “It’s unbelievable. 
Japan lost in this field” (Japan Economic 
Newswire, 2003).
In India, however, space officials down-
played the technical aspects of China’s launch, 
confidently asserting that India could do the 
same if it chose to, which they said it did not. 
Economics and need (what can a manned 
mission achieve that an unmanned mission 
cannot?) were cited as reasons for that choice 
(Agence France Presse, 2003).
However, then Indian prime minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee congratulated China on its 
success and publicly encouraged Indian scien-
tists to work toward a manned lunar mission. 
“Those who wonder what could be achieved 
by such space missions simply want the status 
quo to continue”, he proclaimed prior to the 
launch (Agence France Presse, 2003). It is un-
clear to or about whom he was speaking –the 
rest of the world, his own scientific communi-
ty, or perhaps both. Just two days after China’s 
taikonaut launch, India launched into orbit its 
most sophisticated remote sensing satellite to 
date. The lack of consequent fanfare certainly 
validated Beijing’s manned spaceflight ap-
proach for maximum prestige value.
Since the 1960’s India has had an ambi-
tious space program, one often considered per-
haps extravagant for a poor country. (Johnson-
Freese & Hoey, 2010). Childhood malnutri-
tion remains a sweeping problem in India and 
as of 2012, 32% of India’s population is con-
sidered to live below the international poverty 
line (Somini, 2009)1. Until recently, however, 
India’s space program largely enjoyed domestic 
support. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, considered the 
father of India’s space program, clearly linked 
heavenly goals to terrestrial responsibilities.
There are some who question the relevance of 
space activities in a developing nation. To us, there is 
no ambiguity of purpose. We do not have the fantasy 
of competing with the economically advanced na-
tions in the exploration of the moon or the planets 
or manned space-flight. But we are concerned that if 
we are to play a meaningful role nationally, and in the 
community of nations, we must be second to none in 
the application of advanced technologies to the real 
1 See: unicef statistics, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/india_statistics.html#69, http://www.unicef.org/
infobycountry/india_statistics.html
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problems of man and society. (Indian Space Research 
Organization).
While that quote remains as a banner on the 
official website of the Indian Space Research 
Organization (isro), India’s outlook and plans 
for space have changed dramatically over the 
past 5-7 years. They are now much more in line 
with the vision of former President Abdul Ka-
lam (2002-2007), a key developer and expli-
cator of India’s nuclear and missile programs.
While India once rejected human space-
flight as an extravagance of the rich, it has now 
embarked on an accelerated plan for human 
spaceflight to the moon and beyond. India’s 
plans are outlined in Space Vision 2025, relea-
sed in 2009. Theoretically, it is nested into the 
goals of India Vision 2020, authored by Kalam. 
While still including such goals as satellite ba-
sed communications and navigation systems 
for rural connectivity, and enhanced imaging 
capability for natural resource management, 
weather and climate change studies, it also 
now includes planetary exploration, develop-
ment of a heavy lift launcher, reusable launch 
vehicles and human spaceflight. The specifics 
initially included a man on the moon by 2020, 
robotic missions to Mars, and to a nearby 
asteroid and to an observable distance from 
the sun. In discussions with Indian analysts, 
this philosophical change is often explained as 
simply “evolutionary”.
India’s space agenda is considered by 
many as even more ambitious than China’s. 
India has already successfully launched the 
Chandrayaan -1 lunar orbiter on its Polar Sa-
tellite launch vehicle in 2008. Though Chan-
drayaan-2 was originally scheduled for launch 
in 2012, it has been postponed until 2016 or 
2017. Perhaps most impressively, India’s Mars 
Orbiter Mission (mom), or Mangalyaan, was 
successfully launched in 2013, and will reach 
Mars in September 2014. Only the United 
States, Europe and Russia have previously 
achieved that goal – with China noticeably 
missing from that list. mom put India into 
the record books as the first Asian country 
headed to the Red Planet, something not un-
noticed in news coverage. When the low-cost 
($73 million), fast-turn-around mom mission 
was launched, the Christian Science Monitor 
heralded, “India’s Mars mission leaves earth 
orbit – surpasses Chinese ambitions” (Asokan 
& Reuters, 2013). India created and launched 
the mission on a highly accelerated schedule 
(Rai, 2014) to meet a small launch window, 
less than two years, demonstrating the im-
portance placed on making that window, for 
reasons of both science – and the record books.
Within the realm of human spaceflight, 
an unmanned launch of a prototype capsule 
capable of carrying humans into space on a 
variant of India’s Geosynchronous Satellite 
Launch Vehicle is projected for 2014, although 
funding remains tenuous (Ananthaswamy, 
2014). A manned mission will likely not occur 
for another 4 or 5 years. In January 2010, the 
Indian government said a manned mission 
would occur in 2016, with a moon landing 
by 2020 so clearly, and not unexpectedly, 
delays are already occurring. Early human 
spaceflights may get an assist from Russia, as 
did China’s early ventures. It is anticipated that 
Moscow will help with astronaut training. Pre-
viously, there had even been talks about India 
accelerating its human spaceflight program by 
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buying a Russian Soyuz capsule to send two 
astronauts into orbit in 2013 (Interfax-avn, 
2010).
India’s new, expanded approach to space 
has not come without criticism. “India has ma-
jor issues regarding education, health and rural 
sanitation, and these struggle to get funds”, 
said columnist Praful Bidwai. “yet here we are, 
funding a giant national ego trip when people 
do not have latrines. It’s monstrous” (Ramesh, 
2009). Others discount the link between 
India’s poverty and expanded expenditures 
on human spaceflight. “The poor will always 
be around… If only the lunar mission’s bill of 
U.S. $77 million –or even a bigger amount, 
according to other estimates– could make even 
a minute difference to the undoubted privation 
of the poor…Moon shots, of course, are more 
ambitious and may be less lucrative (than the 
information technology sector), but they are 
a milestone to which countries aspire on the 
way to becoming major powers” (Hoey, 2009).
Human spaceflight programs historically 
have had a hard time competing against popu-
list issues for government funding, because the 
public gets a vote, as evidenced by both Europe 
and Japan having the technological potential 
for a human spaceflight program but lacking 
the political will. The 2009 cancellation of the 
Constellation program in the United States 
similarly reflects public priorities. There seems 
only one way for democracies to avoid resis-
tance to human spaceflight goals over other 
national priorities, and that is to link it to 
other strategic goals. In the case of the United 
States, it was techno-nationalism during the 
Cold War. So too is it for India, in a techno-
nationalist race against China. India has an 
advantage over other democracies though, as it 
has basically been on a war-fighting economy 
since its inception, with the populace largely 
willing to make economic choices prioritizing 
those areas the government deems important 
to security, broadly defined.
Just as space and prestige are linked, so 
too are security and space inherently linked, 
due to the dual-use nature of the technology. 
Not only has India been feeling pressure from 
the prestige China has reaped from its spa-
ce accomplishments, but from the military 
potential of the space technology China has 
been developing. As succinctly headlined by 
long-time American aerospace journalist Craig 
Covault in 2012, “India Races China for Asian 
Prestige, Military Security” (Covault, 2012).
India states that its space program is in-
tended for “peaceful” purposes only. Different 
countries define “peaceful” differently though. 
India considered its nuclear program peaceful 
right up to and including its 1974 test, and 
there are significant parallels, for example, 
between India’s nuclear program development 
and its current space program development. 
Former President Kalam’s definition of pea-
ceful provides India considerable latitude. “In 
the 3,000-year history of India, barring 600 
years, the country has been ruled by others. 
If you need development, the country should 
witness peace, and peace is ensured by streng-
th. Missiles were developed to strengthen the 
country” (The Hindu, 2008). Kalam’s winding 
but consistent view of what constitutes a “pea-
ceful” program is also evident regarding space 
and provides the rationale for developing a 
wide range of new and emerging space techno-
logies with far-reaching military applications.
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In the spring of 2000, a report entitled 
“Military Dimensions in the Future of the 
Indian Presence in Space” caused waves within 
official circles but drew little international at-
tention, probably due to its lack of availability 
outside of India. Perhaps most controversial 
was its suggestion that India could deploy a 
directed-energy weapon, such as a particle 
beam weapon, in space by 2010 and also a 
system referred to as the kali (kinetic attack 
loitering interceptor). Likely not coincidenta-
lly, Kali is also the Hindu goddess of death. At 
the time of publication, the paper’s author, Dr. 
V. Siddharta, was an officer on special duty in 
the secretariat of the scientific advisor to the 
Defense Minister. The paper is testament to, at 
the very least, a long-standing interest within 
the Indian military of deploying not only a 
space-based laser, but also an asat system.
Over the past decade, there has been no 
shortage of inflammatory comments made 
by Indian military officials claiming India’s 
intent to weaponize space. There has also been 
no shortage of contradictions to these state-
ments from India’s most senior government 
officials – oftentimes happening within days 
of one another. For example, on January 26, 
2007, after China’s satellite shoot-down, Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh and then-Russian 
President Vladimir Putin convened a joint 
press conference where Singh declared: “Our 
position is similar in that we are not in favor 
of the weaponization of outer space”. This was 
just one day after then-Indian Air Force (iaf) 
chief Shashi Tyagi had stated, “As the reach of 
our air force is expanding, it has become ex-
tremely important that we exploit space, and 
for it you need space assets”.
The pragmatic aspect of India’s quest to 
keep up with China in space, including asat 
development, also stems from past experience 
with nuclear weapons and the 1970 Non-
Proliferation Treaty (npt). The npt basically 
divides the world into nuclear “have” (those 
countries which had nuclear weapons prior 
to 1970) and “have-not” countries, with the 
“have” countries bestowed nearly full latitude 
on their nuclear development, with the “have-
nots” highly restricted. India did not sign the 
npt, exploded a nuclear weapon in 1974 and 
was thereafter denied nuclear technology from 
the West. Feeling stung from that npt expe-
rience and determined not to be a “have not” 
in any potential space weapons treaty, India 
has been actively pursuing missile defense cum 
asat technology. Just as China tests asat capa-
ble technology through missile defense tests, 
so too does India (Samson, 2010).
India began missile defense tests in 2006, 
with increasing levels of difficulty and achie-
vement since then. As Indian scholar Amit 
Saksena noted in his 2014 analysis of India’s 
military space efforts, “The line between mi-
litarization [of space] and weaponization is 
blurred” (2014). India is not the first country 
to take advantage of that blurred line.
Both India and China deny a space race 
between them. China is prudent to do so, as 
acknowledging India’s effort would only give 
India the credibility it seeks as a challenger. 
India denies a race so as not to be measured 
against China’s substantial lead. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that both feel compelled to deve-
lop technology comparable to those it feels 
challenged by, militarily and/or for regional 
leadership. In the case of China, the perceived 
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challenge is from the United States; in the case 
of India, it is China.
ImPLIcAtIOns FOr OtHer cOuntrIes
Of the original bric countries, all have active, 
even ambitious space programs save Brazil. 
Brazil has a space program but, like most other 
countries, its ambitions exceed subsequent 
supportive political will and so funding. Whi-
le certainly it is the case that Brazil has many 
other ambitious government programs that 
currently take priority, including both the up-
coming World Cup games and the Olympics, 
it is also a fact that its regional leadership is 
not challenged by any other country, generally 
or regarding space activity. While Argentina, 
Colombia, Chile, and Venezuela are engaged 
in space activities beyond being user states, 
their programs are small.
Brazil has had a space agency since 1994, 
has its own launch sites and has engaged in 
cooperative international programs, most 
notably an Earth Resources Satellite program 
with China, and being a bilateral partner with 
the United States on the International Space 
Station. In the 1990’s Brazil outlined an ambi-
tious plan toward space autonomy, including 
satellite and launcher development. But in 
2003, a rocket exploded on a launch pad at 
Brazil’s Alcantara launch site, days before it 
was scheduled to be launched, killing 21 of 
Brazil’s top space scientists and engineers. De-
vastated officials vowed at the time to continue 
with the program, toward making Brazil Latin 
America’s first space power. Project officials ap-
pealed to the federal government for support 
(Garrone, 2003), but the risks and economics 
of space caught up with Brazilian ambitions 
and the program slowed. Joint projects may 
offer Brazil the best prospect for moving more 
than incrementally, with Russia offering Brazil 
cooperative opportunities in 2013 (Sputnik 
News, 2013).
Elsewhere, other countries profess space 
ambitions, but those ambitions largely coin-
cide with testing their missile technology. Iran 
and Pakistan are closely watching Indian and 
Chinese space activities. So far, however, there 
appears no impetus to commit serious funding 
for a broad-based space program on the scale 
of India or China. Iran’s techno-nationalism 
is currently playing out through its nuclear 
program, and Pakistan has largely limited its 
techno-nationalist urges to going tit-for-tat 
with India on nuclear weapons and missiles. 
Both Iran and Pakistan have missile technology 
that could be used for spaceflight –and Iran has 
even boasted that it will put an astronaut on the 
moon by 2025 (Hsu, 2010)– but in both cases 
national priority has actually been on missile 
development. Similarly, North Korea profes-
ses to have a space program, though testing its 
missile technology is clearly its main concern.
Without prestige linked to regional lea-
dership being at risk, or a security dilemma 
linked to space technology, it is unlikely any 
other countries will commit the requisite fun-
ding for a serious space race in the near future. 
Space activities are high cost, high risk endea-
vors, as nations and entrepreneurs both have 
found. Success carries with it great prestige, 
technological benefits and potentially even 
economic returns. But the road to success is 
filled with peril; peril few countries seem wi-
lling to take on without significant impetus.
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